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THE DIALOGUE BETWEEN STUDENTS OF BUSINESS AND
STUDENTS OF ANTITRUST
A KEYNOTE ADDRESS
THOMAS B. LEARY*

It is both a pleasure and a privilege to introduce this American
Antitrust Institute program on "Stretching the Envelope" of our
thinking about antitrust policy. The American Antitrust Institute
provides a forum for people who question established wisdom and
suggest new ideas, and if I have learned one thing in forty-plus years
of involvement with antitrust policy, it is that we always should be
willing to entertain new ideas. A good friend reminded me recently
that all of us need to remain humble, particularly those who not
only reflect on antitrust policies but also have some responsibility
for implementing them. The best definition of humility, not found
in any dictionary, is willingness to be taught. I want to approach my
assignment here in that spirit.
A theme of this conference and the subject of this introductory
speech is the potential for improved antitrust enforcement through
a more active dialogue between the traditional antitrust community
and the faculty and students in business schools. Here, as always,
the word "dialogue" suggests a two-way exchange.
1.

THE CHALLENGE OF INCIPIENCY STATUTES AND THE
INEVITABILITY OF SUBJECTviTY

I am not sure that business people understand what antitrust
enforcement is all about. Commentators who draw an analogy between antitrust agencies and "cops" on a business beat do not help
because it suggests that antitrust offenses, like street crimes, are obvious and readily identifiable. An analogy to "umpires" on a playing
* Commissioner, Federal Trade Commission. A preliminary and unwritten version of this speech was given at the Notre Dame Research Workshop and Conference
on Marketing, Competitive Conduct and Antitrust Policy on May 3, 2002. These are
individual views, not necessarily shared by any other commissioner. I acknowledge the
assistance of my advisor Thomas J. Klotz in the preparation of this paper.
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field is not much better because umpires do have to exercise some
judgment about the existence of an offense or a "foul," but they are
always reviewing events that have already occurred rather than incipient threats of future consequences.
Antitrust is different. With the exception of so-called "per se"
offenses that are presumed to cause immediate consumer harm,'
all antitrust is focused to some degree on incipiency concerns. Statutes like Sections 3 and 7 of the Clayton Act, 2 which refer to conduct that "may... substantially ... lessen competition, or ... tend
to create a monopoly," expressly invite consideration of potential
future effects. The rich rule-of-reason jurisprudence that gives content to Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act, or Section 5 of the
Federal Trade Commission Act,3 similarly requires consideration of
future consequences in appropriate cases.
Some have argued that the incipiency component of antitrust
has been improperly ignored in recent years, 4 but I think it is more
accurate to say that people have different views on the extent to
which long-term predictions need to be discounted and, perhaps,
different tolerances for errors of under-enforcement or over-enforcement (so-called "Type I" and "Type II"). For example, we really have no objective way to evaluate arguments that particular
forms of competition, with immediate pro-consumer effects, will so
adversely affect competitors that consumers will be harmed in the
long run. Harold Demsetz summed up the problem succinctly
about ten years ago, in a speech that never got the attention it deserved: "People with opposing views on this issue implicitly believe
in different rates of transformation between competition now and
5
competition in the future."
1. See Northern Pac. R.R. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958) (per se offenses "are conclusively presumed to be unreasonable and therefore illegal without
elaborate inquiry" and such practices include "price fixing, division of markets, group
boycotts, and tying arrangements").
2. 15 U.S.C. §§ 14, 18 (2000).
3. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2, 45 (2000).
4. See Robert H. Lande, Resurrecting Incipiency: From Von's Grocery to Consumer
Choice, 68 ANTITRuST L.J. 875 (2001).
5. See Harold Demsetz, 100 Years of Antitrust: Should We Celebrate?, Brent T. Upson
Memorial Lecture, George Mason University School of Law, Law & Economics Center,
at 8 (1991).
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The inherently subjective nature of these judgements should
not surprise students of business, whose work is prominently and
appropriately featured here today. Even though corporate executives typically are required by governing state law6 to focus on a
single overriding concern, shareholder return, and they have available increasingly sophisticated tools to measure and to forecast, they
would indignantly reject any suggestion that they could be replaced
by a computer or a statistician. There is always room for the exercise of judgement. In particular, executives have the discretion to
make investments that have an immediate adverse effect on earnings but the potential for a long-term payoff, and reasonable people
can disagree about these predictions.
We in government who are responsible to enforce antitrust
laws are in many ways similar. It is now generally agreed that we
also have a single overriding concern, though our focus is on consumer welfare rather than shareholder welfare (goals that are not
necessarily in conflict). In some ways, our job is easier because we
are not required to enhance consumer welfare across the board but
rather to focus on particular business practices, which come to our
attention one way or the other, and to determine whether they will
have an adverse effect. In this sense, we are reactive rather than
proactive. In another respect, however, our job is harder because
the decisions we make in one case will inevitably have some impact
on people who are not before us. We create precedents.
2.

THE NEED FOR PREDICTABILITY

I do not need to explain the role of precedents to an audience
of people brought up in the common law tradition. But, we sometimes underestimate the critical importance of precedents or signposts in a field like antitrust, where the statutory standards are
vague and enforcement is so diffused. The antitrust laws are not
really enforced by bureaucrats like me; we in federal or state governments review only a minute fraction of the business strategies
that are considered every day in areas of potential concern. The
same is true of so-called "private attorneys general." The people
6.

WILLIAM MEADE FLETCHER,

3

CYCLOPEDIA

OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORA-

§§ 837.50, 161-67 (2002) (Officers and directors of a corporation have a fiduciary
relationship to the corporation and its shareholders).

TIONS
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who really enforce the antitrust laws, day-to-day, are private counselors employed either as "inside" or "outside" lawyers. When I was
responsible for antitrust compliance at General Motors during the
1970s, I once told the then-head of the Antitrust Division-only
half-jokingly-that I dealt with more potential antitrust problems
before breakfast every day than he saw in a week.
Enforcement realities mandate that antitrust rules not only
make sense to the deep thinkers present in this room, and people
who judge business conduct after the fact, but also that they be
transparent to the people who have the prime responsibility for applying them before the fact. It is not enough that the rules be as
7
accurate as possible; they also need to be predictable.
The competing claims of accuracy and predictability have been
the subject of extended debate and compromise. When we apply
rules of per se illegality to naked cartels, or rules of per se legality to
sales above some measure of cost, we recognize that this inflexibility
can adversely affect accuracy. Similarly, a full rule-of-reason analysis
in the interest of accuracy can sacrifice predictability (not to mention economy). It may seem that there is some Heisenberg uncertainty principle" of antitrust lurking here; as we move toward one
goal, we inevitably move away from the other.
I am, perhaps unreasonably, somewhat more optimistic. With
your indulgence, let me refer to another example from personal
experience. I once attended a meeting at General Motors where
the president of the company instructed a project manager to work
with suppliers to develop a tire that would dramatically improve
both traction and durability. By then, I knew enough about the
subject to understand that the objectives were inconsistent-an "aggressive" chunky design that maximizes traction is inherently less
durable-and I asked the manager whether he was troubled by this
apparently inconsistent instruction. The manager said: "Not at all.
The president knows very well that the objectives tug in opposite
directions. He's just telling me that I always need to be mindful of
7. See Thomas B. Leary, Do the Proposals Make Any Sense From a Business Standpoint?, 49 ANTITRUST L.J. 1281, 1285-88 (1980).
8.
The Heisenberg uncertainty principle, familiar to students of particle physics,
holds that you cannot simultaneously determine both the location and the motion of a
particle with accuracy; the more precisely you measure one attribute, the less precise
you can be about the other.
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both." And that is what happened. The seemingly inconsistent
goals were accommodated, not just by tweaking the tread designs,
but by "stretching the envelope" and changing the ways that tires
are made. 9
This little incident has remained fresh in my mind for almost
thirty years, because it illustrates the problem of thinking like a lawyer. As lawyers, we are used to "guilty" or "not guilty" outcomes,
and our clients sometimes expect us to give bottom-line "go" or "no
go" advice. Our training and the demands of our occupation encourage an "either or" view of the world but the antitrust problems
we confront are not like that. We may be required to make "go/no
go" determinations, but we should not delude ourselves into thinking that business conduct fits into such neat categories. For example, it is too simplistic to believe that conduct is either predatory
and anti-competitive or efficient and pro-competitive, with no alternative possibilities."' In my experience, there is a likely alternative,
namely, that a particular strategy will be efficient in the short-term
and anticompetitive in the long-term. Business strategists are fully
aware of these possibilities. Perhaps, we can do a better job as government enforcers and as counselors if we pay more attention to
people who know how business people think, and business people
will respond to advice more readily if antitrust rules are explained
to them in language that they will understand.
This story, and some others that will be told below, help me to
appreciate what this session is all about. It is not concerned with
nice legal distinctions and refinements of doctrine. The conference is exploring whether there are some new ways of looking at
antitrust problems that will improve both predictability and
accuracy.
3.

THE Box SCORE ON PREDICTABILITY AND AccuRAcy

Merger law enforcement is, perhaps, the most important and
the most challenging. Some weeks ago, I completed the draft of a
9.
If anyone is interested, innovative steel-belted radial tires provided better traction and better durability.
10. See ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX 138-39 (1978)(arguing that
these two possibilities "exhaust the possible motivations for profit-maximizing behavior"). Much as I admire Judge Bork's treatise, I think he is wrong on this one.
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paper called The Essential Stability of Merger Policy in the United
States.1 This paper argues that, contrary to popular belief, there
was not much difference between merger enforcement in the 1980s
and the 1990s. For example, the ratio of mergers challenged to
mergers notified remained surprisingly stable. Also noteworthy,
however, is the fact that the incidence of challenged mergers is so
low - year after year, with rare exceptions, less than one percent
of the mergers notified have been challenged by the Federal Trade
Commission and the Department of justice! This means, at the
very least, that a relatively small amount of private and public resources were devoted to the investigation of problematic mergers
that were doomed from the start. I also believe that the low challenge percentages tell us something about predictability.
It is possible, of course, that a very low challenge rate evidences
nothing more than a persistently low level of agency oversight,
rather like the rate of traffic tickets given to red-light runners in the
city of Washington. In this case, merger challenges would be essentially random events. This explanation is unlikely, however, in an
environment where all mergers above a certain size must be prenotified, and I suspect most experienced counselors would dispute
it. It is also possible that the low challenge rate is evidence that
companies and their counsel are highly risk averse. Again, I regard
this explanation as unlikely in an environment that rewards aggressive management and aggressive counsel.
I am inclined to believe that, notwithstanding a progressive
weakening of numerical presumptions in successive versions of the
merger guidelines, enforcement policy has somehow continued to
be remarkably predictable. The combination of guidelines, decisions and consent decrees, speeches and informal discussions with
an increasingly specialized merger bar seems to have effectively
communicated agency intentions in this highly fact-specific area of
antitrust.
The next question is whether merger enforcement policies are
accurate. Challenge percentages are of slight relevance here because predictable enforcement may still be seriously misguided. I
say "slight relevance" rather than "no relevance" because the per11.

See Thomas B. Leary, The EssentialStability of Merger Policy in the United States, 70
105 (2002).

ANTITRUST LJ.
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centages may tell us something about consensus in the public and
private sector. If it is assumed that merger policy evolves in a twoway interchange and if it is further assumed that, to some degree,
private parties (or the states) may be willing to challenge agency
determinations in court, we may be able to draw some comfort
from the fact that relatively few mergers appear to be controversial.
It is still true, however, that the legal rules applied to mergers and
other possibly anti-competitive business strategies are still the particular province of a small circle of lawyers and economists, who
talk to one another incessantly-usually, in very nice places. The
fact that people in this circle seem to agree so often is encouraging,
but do our policies make sense to people outside the circle?
4.

THE IMPORTANCE OF "STRETCHING THE ENVELOPE"

It is significant that the sponsors of this conference have seen
fit to continue and expand on sessions sponsored by the Antitrust
Section of the American Bar Association on January 11 and July 18,
2001.12 There is a growing recognition of the need to examine
some of the fundamental assumptions of our present antitrust regime and to consider the contributions of other disciplines.
I do not intend to revisit my own individual questions that are
discussed elsewhere,' 3 and I will not presume to paraphrase the far
more significant contributions of others who are also concerned
about the intellectual foundations of antitrust.' 4 All I will say here,
in summary, is that I believe our present methods of antitrust analysis are still mired too much in an obsolete view of what competition
is all about and that they are likely to become increasingly unrealis12.
See A.B.A. Sec. Antitrust Law, PERSPECTIVES ON FUNDAMENTAL ANTITRUST THEORY (2001); A.B.A. Sec. Antitrust Law, PERSPECTrVES ON THE CONCEPTS OF TIME, CHANGE,

(2001).
13.
See Thomas B. Leary, The Significance of Variety in Antitrust, 68 ANTITRUST
L.J. 1007 (2001); Thomas B. Leary, Antitrust Economics: Three Cheers and Two Challenges
(speech before Charles River Associates Antitrust Conference, Washington, D.C., on
Nov. 15, 2000), available at http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/leary/learythreecheers.htm.
14. See Perspectives on FundamentalAntitrust Theory, supra note 12; See Perspectives on
the Concepts of Time, Change, and Materiality in Antitrust Enforcement, supra note 12; David
T. Scheffman, Making Sense of Mergers, Antitrust Bulletin (forthcoming); Federal Trade
Commission Bureau of Economics, Empirical Industrial Organization Roundtable
(Sept. 11, 2001), available at http://www.ftc.gov/be/empiricalioroundtabletranscript.
pdf.
AND MATERIALITY IN ANTITRUST ENFORCEMEN"T
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tic. We still focus primarily on price competition and on relatively
short-term competitive effects-in part, I suspect, because they are
easier to model and to measure. In this respect, we are like the
apocryphal drunk who looks for his lost car keys under the lamppost because that is the only place that he will be able to find them.
I further suspect that criticism of our present methodology is
relatively muted today because a lot of keys may still be under the
lamppost. We might be deciding some cases "right" for the "wrong"
reasons, but someday our luck could run out. Hence, the need for
conferences like this one.
When we consider a possible research agenda for the future, it
may be helpful to start by looking at some of the similarities and
differences between the situation today and the situation that existed some thirty years ago, when a vanguard of academic thinkers
were attacking the very foundations of antitrust jurisprudence.
These academics argued that the courts improperly focused on
non-economic issues and that the economic principles they did apply were simply wrong.
Empirical research had cast doubt on the commonly accepted
notion that concentrated industries performed poorly.1 5 Emerging
economic theories suggested that previously suspect practices like
tying, exclusive dealing or resale restraints-could be pro-competitive. Existing antitrust policy was viewed as wrongheaded and inconsistent, literally "A Policy at War with Itself."' 16
The situation is different today than it was thirty years ago, in
that mainstream critics do not argue that antitrust policies are fundamentally flawed or that most cases are wrongly decided. Disagreements tend to be more fact specific and a great deal less
ideological. The once-lively debate about the relevance of social
and political factors seems to have subsided, and people typically
viewed as "conservative" or "liberal" are found on both sides of the
argument in particular cases. 1 7 The situation is similar, however, in
15.
See, e.g.,John S. McGee, Efficiency and Economies of Size, in INDUSTRIAL CONCENTRATION: THE NEW LEARNING 55 (HarveyJ. Goldschmid, et al. eds., 1974). But see F.M.
Scherer, Economies of Scale and Industrial Concentration, in INDUSTRIAL CONCENTRATION:
THE NEW LEARNING 16 (HarveyJ. Goldschmid, et al. eds., 1974).

16.
See Bork, supra note 10. Ironically, by the time this immensely influential book
was published, the tide had turned.
17.
See Leary, supra note 1, at 50.
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that a great deal of empirical and theoretical work remains to be
done. There are a lot of things we still do not know. In my view,
business school scholarship can make a contribution in both the
empirical and the theoretical areas.
5.

QUALITATIVE ISSUES IN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS

In the vast body of commentary about antitrust issues, there
appears to be very little empirical evidence on whether enforcement has been overly aggressive or not aggressive enough, either at
the macro or the micro level. We do not know much about the
effects of antitrust policies on the economy as a whole or on individual industries that have (or have not) been the focus of antitrust
activity. I am not sure how you would even begin to assess macro
effects, but, initially, it might seem that studies at the micro level
could readily be done. However, further thought suggests that,
even here, the job is formidable.
It is particularly difficult to test for Type II errors of over enforcement because it is hard to identify the appropriate parameters
of a study. In the merger area, for example, the relatively small
number of transactions challenged does not represent the universe
of transactions that failed for antitrust reasons. Anyone who has
counseled clients on merger matters knows that a lot of deals are
killed in lawyers' offices. There is no public record of these events,
and business people are highly unlikely to supply information voluntarily. 8 For a variety of reasons, they do not want to talk about
the roads not taken.
Type II errors of under enforcement should be somewhat easier. Significant mergers, for example, are likely to be a matter of
public knowledge, even though agency filings are not. But, there
may be serious data collection issues in this area, as well. 19 Even
more important, perhaps, a retrospective assessment of consummated transactions is not just a mathematical exercise; it requires
considerable industry-specific expertise. A recently proposed joint
18. I have, in the past, found that it is impossible to get businesses to supply this
information, even in aid of legislative or executive initiatives that the businesses might
favor.
19.
If, for example, efficiencies are an issue, it becomes progressively more difficult with the passage of time to isolate merger-related effects.
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venture that the Commission's staff recently reviewed may provide a
hypothetical illustration of why this is so.
A group of doctors in Denver asked for a staff opinion on a
proposal that they be permitted to bargain as a unit with payers,
even though they did not integrate their practices financially. What
they intended to do instead is develop and implement protocols for
clinical practice. The issue for staff was whether this kind of
"clinical" integration would avoid condemnation per se and justify
rule of reason treatment.
Commission staff advised that the proposal would be evaluated
under the rule of reason, 2° advice that I think is correct for reasons
not relevant here. However, in preparation for a speech that I gave
on this subject, 2 1 I considered the issues that might arise if we decided to revisit this venture after the fact to determine whether, on
balance, it had turned out to be beneficial or harmful to consumers. The more I thought about it, the more complex the hypothetical inquiry appeared to be, and the exercise brought home to me
some of the difficulties involved in an after the fact assessment of
innovative business arrangements.
If, for example, we tried at some time in the future to evaluate
the competitive effects of this loose consortium of doctors, under
the rule of reason, it would not be enough simply to show that their
prices had increased. An initial question would be "prices compared to what." Medical services are provided in an unusual economic setting, 22 and it might be that extraneous factors have
caused prices of medical care to increase throughout the Denver
area or the country as a whole. Moreover, how would you adjust for
quality differentials in a field that is evolving rapidly, in light of the
fact that the whole purpose of the venture is to improve the quality
20. FTC StaffAdvisory Opinion Letter toJohnJ. Miles (Feb. 19, 2002), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/bc/adops/medsouth.htm (last visited Feb. 22, 2003). Commissioners do not formally vote on opinion letters of this kind, but we are familiar with them
and do have the opportunity to voice opinions about them.
21.
The speech itself has not yet been published-indeed, has not yet been written out-but was reported at length. See Thomas B. Leary, The Antitrust Implications of
"ClinicalIntegration:"An Analysis of TC Staffs Advisory Opinion to MedSouth, 47 ST. Louis
U. L.J. 217 (2003).
22.
For one thing, the people who receive the services typically do not pay for
them. See generally, e.g., David M. Cutler, A Guide to Health Care Reform, 8 J. EcON. PERSPECTivES 13 (1994).
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of care? Better-quality care might dictate more preventive
medicine, which means more costs up front and lower costs later
on, other things being equal. But, other things will not be equal if
people live longer as the result of better care, resulting in higher
costs overall. Other complications abound.
The point here, obviously, is not to provide a definitive analysis
of the issues involved in this particular venture. The point is to
demonstrate that an analysis of competitive consequences after the
fact involves a lot more than simple mathematical computations; it
requires the application of a lot of specialized knowledge about the
"industry" under study. The issues appear to be particularly difficult to the extent that the products or services are non-homogeneous and innovation is an important factor-complications that are
becoming more, not less, significant. And, if this knowledge is required simply to assess the competitive effects of one venture after
the fact, imagine the further complexity of the effort to do a retrospective analysis of a number of ventures in a variety of industries,
to help determine whether we are generally dealing with incipiency
issues in a sensible way. For one thing, the analysis would have to
consider whether the experience with any particular venture is typical enough to inform policy. The message for students of business,
then, would be that their familiarity with particular industries could
be important, even when we are simply undertaking empirical studies of consummated transactions.
6.

A

DIFFERENT PERSPECTIVE ON THEORETICAL ASSUMPTIONS

The advice of people familiar with business strategies is obviously important when policy-makers are trying to evaluate the potential effects of particular practices. I have already mentioned the
profound impact of scholarly literature, which pointed out that
there were legitimate pro-competitive reasons for various restraints
that had always seemed suspect. Other, more recent literature has
tilted antitrust policy in the opposite direction, by describing busi23
ness strategies that could make predation pay off.

23.

See generallyJanusz A. Ordover & Garth Saloner, Predation,Monopolization and

Antitrust, in I HANDBOOK OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 537 (Richard Schmalensee &

Robert D. Willig eds., 1989).
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We need to better appreciate what the competitive landscape
looks like to the people who do battle on it. I mean that literally. It
is helpful to think in pictures because our views of competition are
subtly shaped by our mental image of what competition is like. For
example, after about ten years of firsthand experience in the automobile industry, I realized that I was looking at competition in a
new way. My early antitrust training gave me the impression that
the ideal form of competition was some kind of unruly scrimmage,
where people struggled for some high ground on the same field,
subject to assaults on all sides, and the more players the better. The
image that came to me later was that competition, at least in the
industry where I worked, was more like the rivalry of different hunting bands-who had a home territory, secure in the short term,
with major battles confined to the borders. That home territory
could be understood as a geographic space, or a product space, or a
collection of particularly loyal customers (and, of course, there
could be more than one), but protection of the home territory is
just as legitimate a competitive objective as doing battle everywhere,
24
all the time.
I believe that the image of hunting bands is increasingly a
more fruitful one than the image of a scrimmage, but need the
help of more learned people in order to think about it systematically. The image might suggest, for example, that the possession of
some market power in particular areas is natural and not cause for
concern; it also might suggest that we should be concerned about
aspects of competition at the fringes, even if other important business strategies are unaffected; 25 it may even suggest that strategic
alliances of relatively distant neighbors can be more important in
the long term than alliances between those who live alongside one
another (the "next-best substitutes").

24.
Cf Howard A. Shelanski & J. Gregory Sidak, Antitrust Divestiture in Network
Industries, 68 U. Ci. L. REV. 1, 11-12 (2001)(Schumpeterian competition where firms
compete through innovation for temporary market dominance, from which they may
be displaced by succeeding developments in products); see also, United States v.
Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 49-50 (D.C. Cir. 2001)(market dominance may be transitory in rapidly changing markets).
25. See Robert H. Lande & Howard P. Marvel, The Three Types of Collusion: Fixing
Prices, Rivals and Rules, 2000 Wis. L. REv. 941 (2000).
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There are other ways in which a better understanding of business reality can enrich our antitrust analysis. We tend to assume,
for example, that business organizations seek to maximize their
profits.

26

It may be the most practical assumption to make in most

cases, but we should not deceive ourselves that an organization can
"seek" anything. It is individuals in organizations who actually seek
things and they are no more exclusively focused on company wel27
fare than public officials are exclusively focused on public welfare.
We all are influenced, in some measure, by purely individual concerns. 28 In addition to this "agency" problem, I also believe that
students of business methods are beginning to question whether
"profit maximization" is a sensible business strategy, even assuming
that all the employees could really be motivated to seek it.29
Other working assumptions of the antitrust community do not
necessarily comport with business reality. When we demonstrate,
for example, that price predation almost never is a rational corporate strategy, this may help prove that it is unlikely to cause consumer harm but it does not necessarily prove that it is unlikely to
occur. (I know because I have seen it.) Similarly, when we theorize that a rational company will decide to "make" or "buy," based
on whether the inside or the outside supplier is more efficient, we
are not taking account of real-world factors like government relations, labor relations, insufficient information or the human tendency to favor the home team. When we theorize that some real26.
in

See Clayton Act Committee, Time, Change, and Materiality Under the Clayton Act,

PERSPECTIVES ON THE CONCEPTS OF TIME, CHANGE AND MATERIALITY IN ANTITRUST EN-

19, 75-76, supra note 12.
See generally Bengt R. Holmstrom & Jean Tirole, The Theory of the Firm, in I
HANDBOOK OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 61, 86-94 (Richard Schmalensee & Robert D.
Willig eds., 1989) (separation of ownership and control).
28. I have observed a number of situations where CEOs who negotiate mergers
are looking at personal upside benefits if the merger succeeds that vastly exceed the
personal downside consequences if the merger fails. I leave it to others, with better
tools, to consider whether these apparently skewed incentives may significantly affect
corporate decisions, and whether it should matter to antitrust policy.
29. See Norman W. Hawker, Antitrust Insights from Strategic Management, Remarks
presented at Research Workshop and Conference on Marketing, Competitive Conduct
and Antitrust Policy, University of Notre Dame Mendoza College of Business, South
Bend, Indiana, (May 3, 2002). Of course, it is possible that words like "sustainable
competitive advantage," used by students of strategy, are just another way of describing
"long-term profit maximization," familiar to students of antitrust. See discussion infra.
FORCEMENT

27.
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world conspiracies are unlikely because of the ability and the incentive to cheat, we forget that even a conspiracy of cheaters can soften
the sharp edges of competition. My favorite example here is the
agreement of Ivy League schools not to award athletic scholarships
(which would be illegal outside the context of college athletics)."",
Cheating is rampant and obvious, but the agreement clearly has an
effect-as demonstrated by the generally inferior performance of
Ivy League teams.
7.

SOME CAUTIONS ABOUT OVERREACTION

"Stretching the Envelope" and opening the antitrust dialogue
to other disciplines will not necessarily have a dramatic impact on
antitrust policy. We may continue to do a lot of the same things,
but with a richer understanding of why we do them. When I claim,
for example, that a better appreciation of complex business motivations is important, I do not mean to suggest that we should necessarily attach greater significance to evidence of "motive" when
deciding cases.3" Attribution of a single "motive" to an organization
where decision makers are likely to have a variety of motives is an
arbitrary exercise and, besides, evidence of motive can be too readily manipulated by lawyers. I imagine all of us with counseling experience have advised clients about the best ways to characterize
their objectives on paper, in the same way that lawyers prepare witnesses for testimony. Skepticism about evidence of motive can,
therefore, cut both ways. It may cause us to discount self-aggrandizing claims that a proposed strategy will yield market dominance,
but it may also cause us to discount predicted efficiencies.
For another example, consider the policy implications of the
fact that business people do not always select profit-maximizing
strategies. Students of business decisions tell us that a relatively
large number of strategies fail,3 2 something that is obvious to any30.
See United States v,Brown Univ., 1993-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) § 70,391 (E.D. Pa.
1991) (Section IX(A) of consent decree).
31.
See RICHARD A. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE 189 (1976)
("the availability of evidence of improper intent is often a function of luck and of the
defendant's legal sophistication, not of the underlying reality").
32. See, e.g., MAX M. MABECK ET AL., AFTER THE MERCER: SEVEN RULES FOR SUCCESSFUL POST-MERGER INTEGRATION 1 (2000) (58% of all mergers fail to increase stock prices
and profitability over 3 year post-merger period).
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one who reads the financial news. We should not jump to the conclusion that tougher antitrust enforcement is needed because
business people make mistakes. We in government do not have any
mandate to interfere, just because we think a particular transaction
is likely to fail, and the market itself disciplines mistakes. Better
information on these issues may, however, cause us to revisit some
assumptions about the pro-competitive or anti-competitive potential of various business strategies. It may also affect our assessment
of the risks associated with Type I or Type II errors.
We in the antitrust community need to better understand what
competition is like in the real world if we are going to make judgements about it. I am not saying that we make decisions in an ivory
tower today. There is considerable embedded expertise in our own
professional staff of lawyers and economists. Moreover, we can, and
do, appreciate industry facts when we interview customers or other
interested parties in investigations. But, it is useful to know
whether snippets of information that we hear, from people who
may or may not have individual agendas, represent views that are
widely held by scholars who specialize in the study of business organizations. We need to test our theoretical models of competitive
harm, or our assumptions about efficiencies, against the views of
dispassionate scholars with practical experience.
When we engage in this dialogue, it is important to remember
that differences in language do not necessarily signify differences in
content. The centerpiece of the ABA Conference on "Fundamental Antitrust Theory," held in January 2000, was a provocative paper
on a "Productivity-Based Approach" to merger analysis, presented
by Michael Porter of the Harvard Business School. a3 I partly agree
with those commentators who argued that Porter was simply using
different language to describe familiar economic concepts that are
34
embedded in existing merger guidelines.
33. See MICHAEL E. PORTER, Competition and Antitrust: Towards a Productivity-Based
Approach to EvaluatingMergers andJoint Ventures, in PERSPECTIIVES ON FUNDAMENTIAL ANTITRUST THEORY

125.

34. See, e.g., Gregory]. Werden, Merger Policy for the 21st Century: Charles D. Weller's
Guidelines Are Not Up to the Task, in PERSPECTIVES ON FUNDAMENTAL ANTITRUST THEORY
355-367. (Porter's "Five Competitive Forces are standard industrial organization economics slightly repackaged."); Jonathan B. Baker & Steven C. Salop, Should Concentration Be Dropped From the Merger Guidelines?, in PERSPECTIVES ON FUNDAMENTAL ANTITRUST
THEORY

339, 352.
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I only partly agree with this critique because some elements in
Porter's particular analysis are genuinely different.3 5 What is more
important, even if I were to make the counter-factual assumption
that Porter has nothing new to say, is the fact that we can always
benefit from a fresh restatement of familiar ideas. We understand
the ideas better when they are presented in a different way in a
different setting, and when the practical consequences are
manifest.
Let me illustrate the point with another personal anecdote. In
the infamous Forner P 6 decision, the Supreme Court held that
uniquely favorable financial terms offered by a credit subsidiary of
U.S. Steel to buyers of its prefabricated homes could support a tying
claim by the plaintiff, a builder who had bought a large number of
them. This seemed silly to me at the time but I really never understood how silly it was until I had the opportunity to participate, as
one of the lawyers for U.S. Steel, in the trial that followed in Louisville, Kentucky. The high point of the plaintiffs case was Mr. Fortner's own lavish description of the extraordinarily generous
financing terms that had been extended to him by the people he
was suing! 37 (Try explaining to clients why this generosity could
give rise to antitrust liability.) That experience of populist antitrust
in action helped me to understand the later academic criticism of
tying law in a way that would not otherwise have been possible.
I personally would like to know what people like you in the
business-school community think about some of our more controversial decisions. We hear from lawyers and eminent forensic economists all the time, but we do not hear much from you. But, you
are training the people who will have to live with the competitive
rules that we create.

35. See, e.g., PORTER, supra note 33, at 154-55 (emphasis on the productivity of the
local business environment); Baker & Salop, supra note 34.
36. United States v. Fortner Enters. Steel Corp., 394 U.S. 495 (1969).
37. Mr. Fortner was an engaging and candid man. He once confided to me
outside the courtroom: "I don't really understand all this antitrust talk-I just didn't
think the houses were any good." Just so. Fortner's perhaps-valid breach of warranty
claim had been transmuted into a tying case by imaginative counsel and, of course, he
wound up with nothing after a decade of litigation. United States Steel Corp. v. Fortner
Enters., 429 U.S. 610 (1977)(Fortner II).
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CIOSING THOUGHTS

The ultimate objective of this richer dialogue is to test whether
our present enforcement policies are adequate or whether we can
make improvements that will serve the twin goals of accuracy and
predictability. This is no easy job, even if we could agree on what
the relevant factors might be. In his oral presentation at the Conference Board meeting in New York earlier this year, Robert Pitofsky read out the factors listed in Michael Porter's famous "Five
Forces" chart,3 8 and questioned how they possibly could be considered and weighed in a manageable proceeding. This exercise was
not intended to denigrate Porter's work at all; Pitofsky acknowledged that we all benefit from exposure to it. The point is simply
that it is very difficult to translate this kind of learning, created for
an entirely different purpose, into manageable legal rules that will
be both credible and capable of being enforced by the myriad private counselors who really must do the job.
We only seek improvement, however, not perfection. We will
never be able to decide whether enforcement policies are accurate
in an absolute sense. The most careful attention to the lessons of
the past may improve our tools for predicting the future but there
will always be an element of uncertainty. Given this uncertainty,
different people will always have different tolerances for risks of various kinds, and they will disagree about the amount of "insurance"
that is needed to guard against them. This disagreement is evident
in debates about subjects as diverse as global warming, nuclear
power, electricity deregulation or antitrust policy.
Even if people can agree on the relevant facts (no small matter), their views will still vary, depending on their value judgements
and their inherent tendency to be pessimistic or optimistic. These
fundamental differences are not worth arguing about. People who
worry a lot and have an activist disposition cannot be talked out of it
by people like me, who tend to think that a lot of things work out
alright if you leave them alone and rather admire Presidents who
keep regular hours. But whatever our basic dispositions and preferences, we can always benefit from the common pursuit of
knowledge.
38.

See PORTER, supra note 33, at 161 (diagram illustrating "Five Forces").
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The American Antitrust Institute, which is hosting this conference, is most actively supported by people who probably have different risk tolerances on antitrust issues than I do. Specifically, I
suspect that they are more concerned about risks of under-enforcement than I am. However, there also are people who worry a lot
more about over-enforcement than I do. I personally have such a
strong belief in the potency of the entrepreneurial drive that I
think our system can adjust to the consequences of a few Type I or
Type II errors.3 9 The common consensus on antitrust is so broad
today that the controversial cases are very close calls.
If I believe that today's close cases can go either way without
significant harm, why do I keep asking questions and encouraging
research and dialogue? There are three principal reasons. First,
the injunction to be humble, acknowledged up front, reminds me
that my relatively relaxed attitude could always be wrong-even if
not wrong today, it could be wrong soon in a fast-changing world.
Second, ongoing communication and participation in common
projects tend ultimately to reduce the areas of disagreement because some factual disputes may be resolved or some misunderstandings clarified. Third, it is important that our policies are
perceived to be realistic by business people most directly affected by
them.
This emphasis on perception looks like, but differs from, the
more familiar argument that a credible antitrust policy is needed to
head off pervasive government controls. 40 I would argue that a
credible antitrust is also important because it lends weight to the
compliance efforts of those myriad private counselors whom we rely
on to enforce the antitrust laws every day. Business people are a lot
more likely to understand and to follow advice if it can be couched
in terms that fit their intellectual framework. A dialogue can serve
the twin goals of predictability and accuracy.
39. This fundamental faith helps to explain why I think the CE/Honeywell controversy has been overblown. See Thomas B. Leary, A Comment on Merger Enforcement in the
United States and in the European Union, Prepared Remarks Before the Transatlantic Business Dialogue Principals Meeting, Washington, D.C. (Oct. 11, 2001), available at http:/
www.ftc.gov/speeches/leary/tabdI01 1l.htm.
40. See, e.g., Robert Pitofsky, Commentary, Brent T. Upson Memorial Lecture, supra
note 5 ("without antitrust, without that powerful symbol ... the alternative of more
intrusive forms of government regulation would have been much more attractive.")
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This conference and others with a similar theme serve an important public purpose. Even though some fundamental differences cannot be resolved, we can at least narrow the areas of
dispute and build consensus support for antitrust policies. In fact,
this has happened in antitrust throughout the last thirty years, here
and throughout the world. Conferences like this one continue the
tradition of the momentous Airlie House event that was held in the
Fall of 1973. 4 1 We meet in a spirit of open inquiry today, as others
did then, to explore New Learning.

41.

The papers from the conference were collected and published in INDUSTRIAL
(Harvey Goldschmid, et al. eds., 1974).
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